This blog post examines the structural reasons behind Baedal Minjok—Korea’s leading delivery platform—experiencing consumer and small business owner defections amid delivery fee hikes and policy changes. It analyzes the data and also explores market competition and regulatory pressures.
It appears that Baedal Minjok, which employed various strategies to boost profits, is ultimately facing a backlash. This is because the controversies and operational burdens surrounding Baedal Minjok, the top player in Korea’s delivery platform market, are intensifying.
According to a recent survey by the Seoul Metropolitan Government of 186 franchise outlets, the average operating profit margin per store was a mere 8.7%. This means that even when selling a 10,000 won meal, only 870 won remains in the owner’s pocket. Amidst sluggish sales due to the economic downturn, the on-the-ground reality is that after deducting various costs, there is virtually no actual profit left.
The problem extends beyond high labor costs, rent, and rising raw material prices. Self-employed owners point to delivery platforms as a major cause of the low-margin structure. This is because the burden of delivery app intermediary fees and delivery charges is growing increasingly heavy. According to Seoul Metropolitan Government, delivery platform sales accounted for 48.8% of total sales, significantly exceeding the 43.3% share of in-store sales.
As dependence on delivery platforms intensifies, pressure on Baemin, operated by Woowa Brothers, is also mounting. Public backlash is spreading against policies imposing fees not only on delivery commissions and rider fees but also on takeout orders. In fact, more self-employed individuals burdened by these policy changes are leaving Baemin. Aware of this public sentiment, the political sphere is also intensifying discussions on various regulations, including a cap on delivery app fees. Since the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration, which has emphasized protecting small business owners and regulating platforms, the policy risks surrounding Baemin remain unresolved.
The business environment surrounding Baemin is also hardly favorable. Signs of consumer defection are emerging in its core food delivery business, while large retailers and big tech companies continue to enter new business areas like quick commerce, instant delivery, and takeout services. The overall situation is assessed as challenging, with even the possibility of its German parent company, Delivery Hero, adjusting its investment stance toward Baemin being discussed.
While Baemin remains the industry leader in its core delivery business, the gap with its competitors is rapidly narrowing. Coupang Eats, in particular, is closing in at a formidable pace. This trend is clearly visible in the Monthly Active Users (MAU), a key metric for gauging app engagement. According to Mobile Index, the MAU gap between Baemin and Coupang Eats stood at 11.32 million users as of August 2025. This represents a significant narrowing compared to 18.16 million in 2023 and 14.70 million in 2024.
Given the nature of delivery apps, a more critical metric than MAU is the daily active users (DAU). While MAU counts users who open the app just once a month, DAU reflects actual usage frequency on a daily basis. In the delivery app market, it’s widely believed that so-called heavy users, who use the app daily, determine success or failure.
By this standard, Baemin’s DAU performance falls short of expectations. As of August 2025, Baemin’s average daily DAU was approximately 5.56 million, down from 5.81 million in the same period the previous year. While MAU slightly increased from 22.81 million to 23.06 million over the same period, this suggests a rise in users who use the app roughly once a month, coupled with a decline in those who use it daily.
Consumer churn is also evident in other metrics. The core audience ratio, representing the top 20% of users within the industry, is a prime example. According to Mobile Index, Baemin’s core audience distribution ratio stood at 43.6% as of August 2024, significantly outpacing Coupang Eats at 12.2% and Ddanggeoyo at 0.4%. However, the situation changed by August 2025. Baemin still maintained the top position at 35.7%, but this figure showed a significant year-over-year decline. Conversely, Coupang Eats reached 15.2% and Ddanggyeo-yo hit 1.9%, indicating increased usage frequency among heavy users.
Another concern is the exodus of self-employed business owners, the core customers of delivery platforms. The MAU of ‘Baemin Shop Owner’, the dedicated app for store owners, decreased from approximately 344,000 in August 2023 to about 319,000 in 2024, and further declined to roughly 307,000 in 2025, showing a continuous downward trend. The core audience ratio also fell from 2.1% in August last year to 1.4% this year.
Meanwhile, the number of store owners using its biggest competitor, Coupang Eats, grew rapidly. The MAU for ‘Coupang Eats Store Owners’ has increased from approximately 149,000 two years ago to an estimated 251,000 in 2025. Some assessments indicate that the gap between the two companies in terms of store owner numbers has nearly disappeared. This data confirms the trend of self-employed individuals, disappointed with Baemin, moving to Coupang Eats.
The reasons self-employed individuals are leaving Baemin are complex. The primary causes cited are the significantly increased commission burden compared to the past and the loss of differentiation. With the discontinuation of Ultra Call, the flat-rate advertising product preferred by store owners, and the establishment of a commission-based structure, the commission burden grew proportionally larger as sales increased. Baemin 1 Plus, introduced last year, also fueled dissatisfaction by effectively forcing the burden of fixed delivery fees through Baemin’s own riders.
During this process, Baemin’s unique differentiation gradually faded. With the flat-rate system gone, Coupang Eats strengthened its competitiveness by promoting single-item delivery, free delivery benefits for Wow members, and single-dish delivery. Consequently, the perception spread that the structures and conditions of the two platforms are not significantly different. While there was once a clear need to use both Baemin and Coupang Eats simultaneously, skepticism is growing about whether maintaining both platforms is truly necessary. Frequent policy changes and unilateral notification methods have further fueled distrust among store owners, which shows no signs of abating.
Amid these simultaneous signs of defection from both consumers and small business owners, it is becoming unclear whether Baemin can maintain its former dominant position. While policies aimed at boosting profitability may contribute to short-term performance improvements, they could ultimately undermine the platform’s very foundation. Consequently, attention is intensifying on Baemin’s choices and strategic direction.
