This blog post examines how the policy of not disclosing Korean bar exam scores affects fair competition within the legal profession and evaluates the validity of this system.
It has been 15 years since law schools were introduced. This year, the 14th cohort of graduates entered the legal market. However, the continued non-disclosure of bar exam scores and rankings makes it difficult for graduates preparing for employment to objectively assess their competitiveness. The current policy of non-disclosure of bar exam scores can be seen as contributing to the increased opacity of the job market for law school students. Therefore, this article critiques the current system of non-disclosure and discusses why this policy is unreasonable.
Article 18 of the Attorney Examination Act, enacted in 2009 when law schools were launched, stipulated that scores would be disclosed to examinees upon request. However, just two years later in 2011, the Attorney Examination Act was amended to prohibit the disclosure of exam scores to anyone except those who failed. In other words, the law governing exam score disclosure was reversed before the first bar exam was even administered. Several ostensible justifications exist for keeping bar exam scores confidential. First, disclosing scores risks transforming law school education into exam-focused training, similar to the judicial examination system, where passing candidates are ranked. Second, it is argued that disclosing scores would undermine the purpose of law schools—to cultivate outstanding talent with diverse expertise and competitiveness through specialized education—and could lead to the ranking of universities and excessive competition among them. Future discussions will refute these arguments and present the rationale for disclosing scores.
First, in the absence of objective metrics to measure a lawyer’s competence, the non-disclosure of bar exam scores allows unfair factors like academic pedigree, family background, and personal connections to become significant determinants in appointments to judges and prosecutors, as well as in hiring by large law firms. Indeed, stories like the one mentioned in the introduction—where a student slated for hire by a top-tier domestic law firm suffered a setback after failing the bar exam—are not unique to this year but occur annually. As mentioned earlier, the fact that a student who failed the bar exam—where over 60% of all examinees pass—secured a pre-employment offer from a law firm that hires fewer than a dozen graduates nationwide from all law schools is a case that sufficiently raises doubts about whether law firms consider background as well as ability when recruiting talent. In other words, it is time to discuss how closely the academic background, law school GPA, and other factors currently considered by law firms during hiring actually correlate with the Bar Exam, which is supposed to determine whether someone is qualified to become a lawyer. Furthermore, statistics on prosecutors appointed by the Ministry of Justice from the first graduating class of law schools in 2013 reveal that SKY universities accounted for 85.7%. This is significantly higher than the 64% SKY representation among prosecutors appointed from the judicial examination graduates between 2010 and 2012, indicating that the hierarchy based on academic background has actually worsened. It was also revealed that 81% of lawyers at the top six law firms, including Kim & Chang, Pacific, and Kwangjang, were graduates of SKY law schools.
It is clear that concealing grades does not prevent the hierarchical ranking of universities; rather, it acts as a factor that further solidifies the academic background cartel. Considering that under the old judicial examination system, scores on the exam and at the training institute were the most objective and effective criteria for judicial appointments and large firm employment, regardless of undergraduate background, the current system contradicts the original intent of introducing law schools. Under the current system, university prestige has become more important than bar exam scores.
Furthermore, a rigid hierarchy exists among law schools nationwide. Students applying to law schools also choose their institutions based on this hierarchy. Another potential problem arising from the non-disclosure of bar exam scores stems from this aspect. While this situation resembles high school graduates choosing universities based on the College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT) and the established hierarchy of those universities, it differs from the era of the old judicial examination. Under the old bar exam system, anyone who completed 60 credits in law subjects could take the exam on equal footing, regardless of their alma mater or undergraduate major. Exam scores were also publicly disclosed. While it cannot be said that their background was never considered in subsequent hiring, the bar exam scores and performance during the judicial training period served as objective competitive indicators for those who were somewhat disadvantaged by their background. Conversely, under the current system where bar exam scores are not disclosed, it is true that those from disadvantaged backgrounds lack any other significant metric to highlight. In other words, if the possibility of rank fluctuations through free competition among them is slim, it becomes difficult to expect development within that system. Consequently, higher-ranked schools are likely to become complacent, while lower-ranked schools face a high risk of falling into despair. Under the current policy of non-disclosure of bar exam scores, students from relatively lower-ranked law schools face a difficult situation upon entering the legal job market after graduation. They struggle to find a turning point that allows them to surpass their existing position, leading to the above situation repeating itself year after year. In this context, disclosing bar exam scores could serve as a new stimulus for both schools and students, potentially yielding positive effects for the entire legal profession.
Considering whether disclosing bar exam scores would indeed cause problems, the first issue is education within law schools. According to those opposing disclosure, if the currently confidential bar exam scores were made public, law school education and student learning would become entirely focused on the subjects of the bar exam. This could be seen as running counter to the original purpose of law schools, which was to cultivate outstanding talent with diverse expertise and competitiveness through specialized education tailored to each school. In other words, they raise concerns that law schools could degenerate into mere cram schools for the bar exam. Notably, the majority of professors currently teaching at law schools oppose disclosing bar exam scores. Under the current system, the grades earned during the three years of law school carry significant weight in the job market. Consequently, students are highly invested in their education within the law school, and professors’ authority is correspondingly strong, lending weight to their argument.
However, it is a fact that under the current system, many law school students use their vacations to attend lectures at law academies preparing for the bar exam, or study using online lectures even during the semester. In other words, considering the inefficient situation where school classes for managing grades and studying for the bar exam are completely separate, their argument cannot necessarily be said to be entirely correct. Furthermore, due to the nature of legal subjects, each professor individually judges what constitutes the majority and minority opinions. This makes it extremely difficult for students to craft answers that align with a professor’s preferences for grade management. Additionally, it is a reality that due to the stubbornness of some professors, students often end up studying material that is far removed from the practical work they will undertake after graduation. Therefore, it can be concluded that this argument does not sufficiently justify the non-disclosure of bar exam scores.
Finally, I wish to address the concern raised by some opponents that disclosing scores will lead to university rankings and excessive competition between schools. If bar exam scores are made public, it is only natural that disparities will emerge between universities based on those scores. The argument is that this disclosure would create a ranking system among law schools based on these scores, leading to excessive competition to improve their standing. In other words, it is claimed that this would introduce another influential metric when graduates enter the job market, significantly impacting each school’s prestige and potentially causing adverse effects.
However, it is an open secret that the hierarchy among law schools is implicitly established regardless of whether exam results are disclosed. While the annual bar exam pass rate is published in news articles, the pass rate by school holds little significance in an exam that passes over 60% of all examinees. Rather than entering the job market with fixed rankings determined at the time of admission, a situation where rankings can shift dynamically based on bar exam performance could actually help enhance each school’s competitiveness. In other words, the restructuring of school rankings and intensified competition resulting from the disclosure of bar exam scores should be viewed as having a positive effect in the long term.
This year marks the 15th anniversary of the introduction of law schools, and at a time when controversy over disclosing bar exam scores persists, I conclude this piece by reiterating that disclosing bar exam scores is not an option but a necessity. This is essential for fostering legal professionals from more diverse fields and backgrounds, aligning with the original intent of establishing law schools, and for ensuring that all accredited law schools nationwide continue to develop rather than stagnate.
