This blog post examines how Inductivism and Falsificationism sought to establish scientific knowledge and explores the limitations of these theories.
The philosophy of science has developed by proposing logical procedures through which specific theories become established as knowledge. Inductivism, advocated by figures like Francis Bacon in the 17th century, played a crucial role in establishing modern philosophy of science. Scientists of this era believed that an inductive approach—collecting empirical data and deriving general laws from it—was the best method for discovering scientific truth. In the early stages of scientific inquiry, inductivism particularly emphasized the importance of experimentation and observation, regarded as essential tools for scientists to broaden their understanding of natural phenomena.
Subsequently, falsificationism emerged, aiming to resolve the logical problems of inductivism. Falsificationism, proposed by Karl Raimund Popper, offered a new methodology for verifying the truth of scientific theories. It emphasized that all scientific knowledge is provisional and can be modified whenever new evidence emerges. Thus, falsificationism argues that scientific progress occurs through the repeated falsification and revision of theories. But did falsificationism perfectly resolve the problems of inductivism?
Inductivism refers to a logical structure for acquiring scientific knowledge through induction, where induction involves formulating empirical laws based on multiple observations. When a phenomenon repeats without exception, one infers that other cases will be identical to the observed ones. Francis Bacon was the one who systematized this into logical steps. In the 17th century, Francis Bacon proposed a premise for acquiring scientific knowledge: first, when collecting cases, one must not hold onto prior beliefs. Bacon notably and directly criticized Aristotle’s scientific knowledge, which had been accepted in Europe for about 2000 years. Next, to obtain the desired facts, one observes specific situations, using methods like experiments. Finally, the observed results are generalized—that is, scientific theories are derived using induction. Explaining science through this method is considered quite reliable because it is based on objective data.
However, the inductive method of creating scientific knowledge through objective data has a fatal flaw: the principle of induction itself cannot be logically justified. Consider a famous example: suppose we gain the scientific knowledge that “all swans are white” through extensive observation. This knowledge was inductively obtained by observing individual swans and confirming that each observed swan was white. However, the fact that all swans observed so far are white does not guarantee that all swans observed in the future will be white. Since we haven’t observed every single swan in existence to arrive at this knowledge, it’s possible that a black swan has simply not been observed yet. In other words, this knowledge could be flawed due to insufficient observation. As this example shows, because induction chooses to explain the whole by combining individual objects, the method of deriving conclusions is inherently incomplete.
The limitations of inductivism extend beyond mere logical issues. As scientific discovery progresses, it frequently occurs that previously generalized laws are invalidated by new evidence. For example, in classical mechanics, Newton’s laws were long regarded as scientific truth, but the advent of Einstein’s theory of relativity revealed that these laws apply only under specific conditions. These historical examples starkly demonstrate the incompleteness of inductivism. Nevertheless, inductivism played a crucial role in the early stages of scientific inquiry by systematically analyzing and generalizing empirical data.
For this reason, ‘Karl Raimund Popper’ proposed falsificationism to address these problems with induction. Falsificationism is a scientific perspective where a theory about a specific phenomenon endures repeated attempts at falsification and is ultimately adopted as the best theory if it withstands these attempts until the present. According to Karl Raimund Popper, scientific theories always possess the characteristic of being refutable by empirical facts; this is called the requirement of falsifiability. Therefore, even a theory that has not been falsified so far cannot necessarily be considered true. However, such theories can be regarded as superior to previous ones. In other words, falsificationists believe that no scientific theory is perfectly true. They saw that as theories gradually emerge that withstand multiple falsifications, theories progressively improve, leading to continuous advancement in theories within specific fields.
As seen above, falsificationism can be seen as partially resolving the problem of inductivism, which derives theories that are true in individual cases, by asserting that no theory is ever completely true. Falsificationism deepened the understanding of the essence of scientific inquiry by emphasizing that science is a process of constant revision and development rather than the pursuit of definitive truth. However, falsificationism failed to resolve the fundamental problems of inductivism, for the following reasons.
First, the results of observation can be erroneous. Falsificationism adopts a method of refuting existing theories by observing counterexamples when testing theories. However, when conducting observations or experiments to find counterexamples, existing theories are used. From Karl Popper’s falsificationist perspective, these theories are currently the best available but are never necessarily true. That is, there is absolutely no guarantee that a counterexample is true, so a counterexample cannot properly refute the existing theory. To refute a specific theory, the observational results refuting it must necessarily be based on some theory. According to falsificationism, since all theories are not true, the very foundation for refuting a specific theory does not exist. Falsificationism was created to replace the logical leaps caused by the inaccuracy of observations inherent in inductivism. However, falsificationism fails to resolve this very problem that inductivism possessed.
Second, the target of falsification is unclear. French philosopher of science Gilbert Durand states that scientific propositions are not standalone but combined with auxiliary assumptions, and it is this combination that can be verified. That is, if T is a theory, O an observational statement, and A an auxiliary assumption, then what O implies is not just T but T&A. Van Quine states that the position of A can even include mathematical statements and logic. Therefore, when verifying a specific theory, it is impossible to determine whether the theory T is incorrect or the auxiliary assumption A is incorrect. To refute a specific theory, one need only demonstrate that T is false. However, it is possible that T&A was incorrectly derived due to a flaw in A. Consequently, the method of falsification employed by falsificationism cannot provide certainty that a specific theory is false.
Thirdly, falsificationism has limitations in explaining the progress of scientific theories. Falsificationism argues that a theory can be temporarily accepted if it remains unfalsified, but this fails to adequately account for scientific revolutions or paradigm shifts. For example, Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory demonstrates that scientific progress often occurs abruptly rather than gradually, and that past theories are sometimes completely discarded while new ones are embraced. Such cases suggest that falsificationism fails to fully capture the actual way science progresses.
For these reasons, falsificationism has also been evaluated as an unsuitable theory for validating scientific knowledge. Not only did falsificationism fail to resolve the problems of inductivism, but it also had its own inherent issues. Given this, falsificationism could never serve as a satisfactory alternative to inductivism.
