This blog post examines whether science is composed solely of pure rationality or if irrational elements are also part of its essence.
In modern society, science is receiving massive investments and its status is becoming increasingly solidified. Some even say that science’s authority in the modern era rivals that of religious authority in the Middle Ages. The medieval era, dominated by religion, is often called the ‘Dark Ages’ because it stifled diverse development. So, can we say that science’s modern status as a symbol of rationality and objectivity is fundamentally different from medieval religious domination? Paul Karl Feyerabend argues that science’s dominance is unjustified and that science does not inherently possess superiority over other academic disciplines. However, many believe the dominance of medieval religion and the status of modern science are different. Science has genuinely benefited the world through numerous discoveries, and its influence and objectivity are immense compared to other disciplines. This blog post will focus on the essence of science that distinguishes it from other disciplines. The essence of science is the element that distinguishes it from other disciplines, akin to what Karl Popper termed the “demarcation problem.” This article will center on the arguments of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, exploring whether their opposing views can be explained through the distinction between theory and hypothesis, activity and logic in science. Furthermore, the conclusion examines whether the essence of science can justify its status in the modern era.
Thomas Kuhn viewed the essence of science as paradigms. He described the scientific community as a group sharing the same ‘paradigm’ and presented the patterns of change in science as ‘normal science’ and ‘scientific revolutions’. According to Kuhn, unlike other disciplines, science possesses a paradigm—a single widely accepted view among members of a specific scientific community—and this paradigm constitutes the essence of science. In the 16th century, a theory emerged that successfully explained many problems, overwhelming competing theories and becoming the first paradigm. Under this paradigm, research was conducted in accordance with its meaning. Research then primarily advances through the redefinition, verification, and clarification of the paradigm. Through the activities of normal science, the paradigm becomes more precise, and the range of solvable problems expands. However, when phenomena that the paradigm cannot explain increase, the scientific community faces a crisis, and extraordinary research commences. During this process, competing new claims are presented, and a new paradigm is accepted through a scientific revolution. Kuhn viewed science as developing through paradigm shifts, but argued this development does not bring science closer to the truth of nature; rather, it simply enables more ‘puzzle solving’. Therefore, he saw scientific revolutions as possessing irrational aspects, and considered each paradigm to be incommensurable.
In contrast, Karl Popper viewed the essence of science as ‘falsifiability’. He described science as the activity of proposing various hypotheses to explain phenomena and striving to falsify those hypotheses. Popper did not see inductive support for theories as the essence of science; rather, he argued that scientific theories must withstand attempts at falsification. If a theory withstands many attempts at falsification, it can attain the status of a scientific theory, but this does not affect its probability of being true. Therefore, falsified theories must be modified or discarded, and Popper saw science as a discipline that continuously develops to approach the truth.
Kuhn and Popper’s arguments are in opposition regarding their perspectives on the nature of science. Kuhn contends that science is irrational, while Popper asserts that science is rational. This opposition stems from differing interpretations of the fact that theories cannot be directly proven to be correct. Kuhn viewed science as progressing through the process of selecting and validating successful theories, whereas Popper believed science approaches truth by falsifying incorrect theories.
I propose interpreting science by dividing it into hypotheses that are not widely accepted and accepted hypotheses (theories), considering both academic activity and logic. Scientific activity involves the process of incorporating hypotheses into theories after review and then subjecting them to falsification. Scientific logic can be interpreted as a process of discarding false theories, with falsifiability as its core principle. The distinction between hypothesis and theory is determined by the degree of acceptance within the academic community, irrespective of attempts at falsification, and this carries an irrational characteristic.
The paradigm of scientific activity possesses irrational characteristics as an academic pursuit, yet scientific propositions developed through falsification evolve into rational logic. Consequently, science can be regarded as an academic system where irrational and rational elements coexist.
This article presented the essence of science, integrating its irrational and rational characteristics. However, further discussion is needed on whether scientific activity and logic can be clearly distinguished. Furthermore, if the irrational characteristics of science are inevitable, how they should be evaluated also requires discussion. While science possesses irrational characteristics, it undergoes a rational process of objectively eliminating false theories through propositions that are falsifiable. The status of science in the modern era can be justified through this process.
