In this blog post, we will explore how to distinguish between science and pseudoscience based on the scientific philosophies of Popper and Kuhn.
Walking down the street, everyone has probably encountered people preaching about their religion at least once. Even if you haven’t, you probably know at least one person who is religious, and with Christmas and Buddha’s Birthday designated as national holidays in South Korea, we are closer to the concept of religion than we think.
Regardless of the religion, its teachings (such as creationism) are mainly referred to as pseudoscience (or pseudo-science). Of course, these are not the only examples of pseudoscience, but religious concepts such as creationism and eugenics are classified as pseudoscience. Pseudoscience is often controversial because it misleads the public, promotes prejudice and discrimination, and imposes narrow-minded values.
When we encounter pseudoscience, we may ask ourselves, “Is pseudoscience really science?” The dictionary definition of science is “the activity of interpreting natural phenomena based on curiosity and creating a systematic body of knowledge.” Based on this dictionary definition, it seems that concepts such as creationism could be included in the category of science.
This essay aims to describe the author’s thoughts on the question, “Is pseudoscience science?” In particular, I will explain several representative examples of pseudoscience based on the philosophical perspective of science, especially the perspectives of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, and draw a final conclusion.
Before answering the original question, let us first examine Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper’s perspectives on science. First, Karl Popper argued in his book that the rationalist tradition of the ancient Greek schools was the only way to expand our knowledge. Starting from “fallibilism,” which believes that human reason is imperfect and capable of error, he developed critical rationalism. Critical rationalism is well illustrated by Popper’s statement below.
“The principle of the attitude I call critical rationalism is that we consciously learn from mistakes and from the continuous correction of mistakes.” – Karl Popper, Das Elend des Historizismus (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1974), p.ⅸ.
Popper believed that only theories that followed this process were scientific theories. He argued that observations cannot be trusted because their results may vary depending on the observer or the observation situation, and therefore cannot be used as arguments for establishing theories. Therefore, he argued that observations and experiments are not used to prove a theory, but to argue that it is false or to refute it. According to his view, new theories are composed of conjectures, and these theories undergo a process of refutation through experiments and observations. Furthermore, he believed that even theories that are currently accepted may be close to the truth, but cannot be asserted as truth.
Popper argued that in order to be classified as a scientific theory, it must be argumentable. Argumentability has two meanings: it cannot be refuted in a purely logical sense, and it cannot be refuted empirically. This is equivalent to saying that a scientific theory is compatible with any empirical statement that is possible.
On the other hand, Thomas Kuhn had a different view of science. The keyword that Kuhn considered most important in science is “paradigm.” This can be interpreted as universally recognized scientific achievements that provide examples and solutions to problems for a group of experts at a given time. The elements of a paradigm include symbolic generalizations (including formalizations such as F=ma), models (such as gas motion models in gas dynamics), and examples. Kuhn believed that scientific activity occurs through paradigm shifts. He used the concept of normal science to explain this. However, Kuhn did not believe that normal science was perfect. He believed that normal science became mainstream because it encompassed other theories of the time and had many advantages, but he did not believe that all phenomena could be explained within that framework. When problems arise that cannot be solved within the framework of normal science (the occurrence of anomalies), he believed that this leads to a crisis in normal science. This negates the existing paradigm, and scientists go through a process of scientific revolution to overcome this crisis and accept a new paradigm.
When asked, “Is the newly accepted paradigm superior to the existing paradigm?” Kuhn responded that competition between paradigms is not simple and proposed the concept of “incommensurability.” This means that there is no common yardstick for comparing different theories or paradigms.
This concludes Carl Popper and Thomas Kuhn’s perspectives on scientific theory. Now, let’s return to the original question: “Is pseudoscience science?” In fact, there were philosophers who defended pseudoscience (although the term was not used at the time). Feyerabend argued that “there is nothing special about science, and even astrology can be science” (astrology is currently classified as pseudoscience). He believed that the best way to make science scientific was to allow as many diverse and novel hypotheses as possible to proliferate without restriction.
However, according to Popper and Kuhn, such arguments in defense of pseudoscience are thoroughly criticized. Consider, for example, creationism, which is perhaps the most obvious example of pseudoscience. From Popper’s point of view, the most important concept for creationism to be classified as a scientific theory is the possibility of argumentation. Is creationism argumentable? What empirical evidence can refute the hypothesis of creationism that “the natural world is too complex to be explained by the process of evolution”? According to creationism, God designed everything, so what examples can be chosen to refute this? The fundamental problem with creationism is that there are no examples that can refute it.
This means that creationism is not falsifiable, and from Popper’s point of view, creationism cannot be a scientific theory. From Kuhn’s point of view, creationism cannot be a scientific theory either. The most important keyword in Kuhn’s view of science is “paradigm.” Paradigms are derived from normal science. Normal science refers to research activities based on past scientific achievements.
Are there any scientific achievements based on creationism? We can answer this question in the negative. The currently accepted paradigm, the theory of evolution, has clearly resolved issues concerning the change and diversity of living things, established academic societies, and led to new discoveries. However, compared to the many great achievements of the theory of evolution, there are no scientific achievements or accomplishments based on creationism. Furthermore, there is no sense of crisis regarding the existing paradigm of evolution theory, which is necessary for creationism to become a new paradigm explaining the natural world, and the prevailing opinion is that there are many natural phenomena that can be explored through evolution theory. This means that creationism cannot be accepted as a new paradigm, and therefore, from Kuhn’s perspective, creationism cannot be a scientific theory.
Another example of pseudoscience is eugenics. Eugenics is a discipline founded by Galton in England in 1883, with the aim of increasing the population with superior qualities and preventing the increase of the population with poor genetic qualities.
All conditions and factors related to the occurrence of physical and mental defects in humans are the focus of research. From the perspective of Popper and Kuhn, can eugenics be classified as a scientific theory? Let us consider the possibility of eugenics being proven from an empirical perspective. Can we find empirical cases that refute the claims of eugenics? The subject of eugenics is people with physical and mental defects.
Therefore, this question is equivalent to asking whether empirical cases can be found within the framework of eugenics that show that people with certain defects are not actually defective compared to people without such defects. Since it is already assumed that they have defects, and since it is impossible to compare all human genes and conclude that some are inferior, this argument cannot be proven empirically. The same is true from Kuhn’s perspective. In order for eugenics to be accepted as a paradigm, it must provide examples and explanations to experts and be universally accepted. Of course, eugenics is accepted in some regions. However, it is practiced in a few countries and its implementation is still being debated. This means that eugenics is not universally accepted and can therefore be interpreted as lacking the function of a paradigm.
From Kuhn’s perspective, eugenics cannot be accepted as a scientific theory. For this reason, I believe that pseudoscience cannot be classified as science. Of course, this essay criticized two representative examples of pseudoscience, but most pseudoscience can also be criticized from the perspective of these two philosophers of science.
Pseudoscience is not developed through a deductive process, but rather, its proponents establish their own theories and then interpret observed facts and experimental results in a way that fits their theoretical framework, rather than using them to critique existing theories. Therefore, all observed cases fall within the framework of pseudoscience, and the claims of pseudoscience are essentially unprovable by these observations. Furthermore, pseudoscience is generally not accepted by most scientists in the scientific community, and various pseudoscientific claims are not used as examples to refute existing mainstream science, but rather as examples to refute pseudoscience. In other words, pseudoscience cannot serve as a paradigm.
Of course, this does not mean that pseudoscience is completely meaningless. It can actually influence currently accepted scientific theories. Just as alchemy, which sought to create gold in the past, had a profound influence on chemistry, it is absurd to dismiss pseudoscience as meaningless. However, I believe that pseudoscience cannot be classified as science because its essence does not conform to the characteristics of scientific theories.
