This blog post examines why republicanism rejects arbitrary rule and makes the common good its core value. It also explores how civic virtue and constitutional order enable self-governance.
Republicanism is an ideology that seeks to realize self-governance by excluding rule by arbitrary power in communal life, based on citizens’ political participation in pursuit of the common good. Regarding what form of community is suitable for this, discussions have long centered primarily on scale. A dilemma exists: for civic virtue to function properly and factions to be controlled, the republic must be small; yet, to provide citizens sufficient security against the threat of foreign invasion, it must be large. The authors of the Federalist Papers (October 1787–August 1788), federalists during the American Constitution’s formation, proposed a federal republic as the solution to this problem. They saw the federal republic as simultaneously providing the benefits of division—preventing the influence of factional leaders from spreading too widely—and the benefits of concentration—enabling a collective response to external enemies.
The growing complexity of citizens’ interests within the community need not be viewed solely as negative. However, it may be far more difficult for people who are inevitably separated by distance, rather than those who live close together and interact daily, to sustain the public spirit of friendship and solidarity. For a republican government to maintain stability across a vast territory, stronger mechanisms would be needed to encourage citizens to restrain the pursuit of private interests and instead aim for the common good. Ultimately, federalists sought to prevent the emergence of factions and tyrannical majorities by introducing various elements of constitutionalism, such as representative government and the separation of powers, grounded in the rule of reason and law. They established a robust framework of constitutional order to ensure citizens’ passion for self-governance neither fades easily nor runs amok.
However, the concept of a constitution as understood by the republicans differed significantly from what we commonly accept today. In modern times, a constitution is understood as a solid document defining the core values and operating principles of a political community, and such a constitution requires a final interpreter to adjudicate constitutional disputes. It is generally the case that administrative actions or laws that appear to conflict with the constitution lose their effect based on this interpretation. In contrast to this legalistic, judicial understanding of the constitution, for republicans, the constitution had a stronger political character, merely indicating the manner of power division within the political community or referring to the specific form of government constituted through such division. The process of balancing competing interests among social groups through the election of rulers and the distribution of political shares has formed the core framework of a sustainable republic since the mixed constitution of the Roman Republic. Therefore, the modern, legal concept of a constitution that emerged in the late 18th century is unlikely to have been a fully intended concept even in the process of envisioning a republican constitution in the United States at that time. Even though a written constitution was adopted, it was closer to possessing a political meaning as a civic charter than a judicial charter.
The reason we must focus on the meaning of the constitution in relation to republicanism is not merely because past republican thinkers were unaware of the legal concept of the constitution. Rather, the problem arises because, under the condition of understanding the constitution in its legal sense, the so-called ㉠ constitutionalist means proposed for republicanism conversely conflict with the core purpose of republicanism. For instance, the concept of laws being constitutionally bound—one such proposed means—faces criticism for fundamentally undermining the republican ideal of entrusting the direction of communal life to the citizens themselves. This is because it reflects a lack of trust in the consensus derived by citizens’ representatives through majority rule. It has also been pointed out that this concept is closer to a liberal device focused on protecting individual rights from state power. In other words, the argument exists that the more judicial review by a wise few is strengthened, the harder it becomes to view that constitution as possessing a republican character; furthermore, it has even acted as an obstacle to the development of American democratic politics.
However, in modern democracy, citizen political participation need not be confined solely to the voting process of electing rulers or exercising allocated shares. Rather, citizen participation can actively unfold centered on arenas of public debate. If judicial review sparks and guides such deliberative processes, ultimately serving to strengthen the rule of law, its evaluation may change. Above all, this perspective holds significant importance as it rediscovers the republicans’ concern—their desire to realize the values of democracy through rational deliberation on the common good. This point also suggests that today’s democratic politics can harmoniously pursue constitutional values and republican ideals within the context of invigorated public discourse.
