This blog post examines various philosophical positions on the objectivity and subjectivity of good, deeply exploring whether good can be established independently of human desires.
In ethics, various issues arise concerning goodness (善, good). What is goodness? Can goodness be equated with pleasure? How does goodness relate to moral rightness or justice? Among these, one of the long-debated core questions is precisely: “Does goodness exist objectively?”
Plato held that the sensible world perceived through the senses is changeable and imperfect, while the world of Ideas, accessible to reason, is unchanging and perfect. According to his argument, since the sensible world is merely an imitation of the world of Ideas, human actions in the sensible world are necessarily imperfect. The world of Ideas contains various forms, such as the Idea of Goodness and the Idea of Beauty, with the highest among them being the ‘Idea of the Good’. The ultimate goal of human reason lies in recognizing this Idea of the Good. Goodness is a sacred and independent entity, so profound it defies complete expression in language, and can only be understood after long education and cultivation. We desire something because it is good. This position, which views goodness as existing independently of human interest, is called ‘classical objectivism’.
Moore, who inherited this Platonic tradition, also argued that values like goodness objectively exist. According to his position, goodness possesses a simple, inanalyzable property like the color yellow; thus, it cannot be defined, and can only be known through intuition. Just as one can only answer “Yellow is yellow” when asked what yellow is, one can only answer “Good is good” when asked what good is. Moore held that when considering a good world and an evil world, the good world is more valuable than the evil world, regardless of whether beings with desires exist within them. Goodness exists independently of human desires and possesses intrinsic value. He defined morally right actions as those that maximize goodness. This argument remains a foundational perspective in modern ethics, subject to both criticism and defense.
In contrast, ‘subjectivism’ understands goodness as merely a product of conscious desires. Perry argued that goodness is created by human desires and interests. According to his view, value depends on interest; an object acquires value only when it becomes the object of interest. That is, value judgments are not inherent in the object itself but are a quality conferred by human interest, and anything humans take an interest in becomes an object of value. Whatever anyone desires acquires value as goodness. Furthermore, Perry believed that the deeper the interest in an object, the greater its value, and the more people express interest in it, the greater its value becomes. Classical objectivists criticize this argument, insisting that desire and goodness must be strictly distinguished. For example, imagine a ‘pleasure machine’ that stimulates nerve cells to induce pleasure, providing extreme enjoyment. Even if someone desires to live inside it for their entire life, we would find it difficult to call that machine good. Even if one experienced no dissatisfaction whatsoever within the pleasure machine, that choice could not objectively be considered good. This pleasure machine analogy remains a frequently cited, important counterargument in contemporary ethics.
Views attempting to reconcile these two positions have also emerged. ‘Moderate Objectivism’ views goodness as a kind of emergent property, understanding that goodness only arises when human desires combine with the objective properties of things. Just as the wetness of water is not inherent within the H₂O molecules themselves, but rather an emergent property arising from the interaction between those molecules and the human nervous system, goodness is seen as integrally formed within the relationship between human desires and objective properties. Accordingly, this position holds that goodness does not exist without beings possessing desires. However, if desiring beings exist, goodness can arise when attributes like pleasure, friendship, or health combine with human desires. Yet, not all desires combine with objective attributes to become goodness, raising the problem of establishing criteria to determine what constitutes ‘appropriate desires’. This issue is a particularly important topic in contemporary ethics, leading to diverse research explaining how value arises between desires and the attributes of the world.
One proposed method to resolve this long-standing debate between objectivism and subjectivism is to postulate an ‘ideal desirer’ who can accurately grasp the consequences of all actions and is free from bias. The logic is that, being free from ignorance or distorted desires, whatever this being chooses becomes good, and whatever it does not choose becomes evil. This concept of the ideal desirer remains a reference point in contemporary normative ethics and moral psychology, serving as a core tool for thought that seeks to reconcile the objectivity and subjectivity of goodness.
