This blog post calmly examines the philosophical basis and meaning behind why even murder without any pain is morally problematic, focusing on classical utilitarianism, preference utilitarianism, and the autonomy principle.
A person refers to a rational being with self-awareness, such as humans or primates. These beings possess the capacity for autonomous judgment and can recognize that their lives will continue into the future. In contrast, animals like fish, lacking such personal characteristics, are non-persons. They possess no self-awareness and only have the sensory capacity to feel pain and pleasure. So why is killing a person a more serious problem than killing a non-person? One reason we consider killing a person wrong is that it inflicts suffering on the victim. But even if we kill someone without causing them any suffering at all, what grounds are there for judging this as wrong?
‘Classical utilitarianism’ evaluates the value of an action based on the total amount of pleasure and pain it causes. Following this perspective, a killing that causes no pain is not only not causing pain to the victim but also eliminating the very agent capable of experiencing pain and pleasure. Therefore, there is no basis to consider it inherently wrong. Therefore, it is difficult to criticize this form of killing based on the ‘direct reason’ of increasing the victim’s suffering. From the classical utilitarian standpoint, one could criticize the killing of a person based on the ‘indirect reason’ of increasing the suffering of others who are not the victim. When a murder becomes known to others, those who learn of it experience anxiety and fear that they too might be killed someday, unlike in the case of non-persons. This increases their suffering. Considering this consequence, murder becomes a bad act.
In contrast, ‘preference utilitarianism’ presents a direct reason for viewing murder as bad, related to the characteristics of persons. This perspective evaluates actions based on whether they satisfy or frustrate the preferences they affect. Thus, even if death occurs without suffering, killing someone who wishes to continue living is considered wrong because it frustrates their preference for life. Crucially, persons are far more future-oriented than non-persons. Therefore, killing a person does not merely thwart one preference but also frustrates numerous future plans and activities they intended to realize. In this respect, killing a person is evaluated as a worse act than killing a non-person.
‘Autonomy-based view’ approaches the issue differently from utilitarianism, presenting a direct reason why killing is wrong. This position evaluates actions based on whether they infringe upon autonomy. Unlike non-persons, persons are autonomous beings capable of considering multiple possibilities, making their own choices, and acting upon those choices. This autonomy of persons must be respected. Persons can grasp the meaning of life and death and choose one over the other for themselves. This choice is the most fundamental decision, and killing someone who has chosen not to die constitutes the most severe level of autonomy violation. In this regard, while utilitarianism does not accept respect for autonomy itself as an independent value or fundamental moral principle, it generally tends to support it because respecting autonomy typically leads to better outcomes.
These arguments concerning the killing of persons should apply equally not only to humans but also to animals like primates. However, applying classical utilitarian arguments to animals like primates may present some difficulties. This is because, compared to humans, primates may find it harder to socially comprehend the death of a fellow member occurring at a distance. Yet, numerous accumulated experiments and observations indicate that primates, including chimpanzees, are beings possessing self-awareness and rationality, confirmed to have preferences and autonomy. Therefore, treating beings with such personal characteristics differently merely because they belong to a different species is unjust, and killing such beings is equally wrong as killing humans. If human beings, as persons, possess a special value of life, then animals like primates, who are also persons, must likewise be recognized as possessing the same special value of life.
