This blog post examines why hedonism, extending beyond mere sensory pleasure, remains a core debate in contemporary ethics, delving deeply into the differences between Bentham and Mill’s philosophies.
Hedonism is an ethical theory asserting that all pleasure has value in itself and that actions producing the greatest pleasure—achieved by increasing pleasure and decreasing pain—are morally right. According to hedonism, pleasure alone possesses intrinsic value, and everything must be evaluated based on this criterion. Hedonism was formalized as selfish hedonism emphasizing individual pleasure by the ancient philosopher Epicurus, and further systematized into hedonistic utilitarianism emphasizing the pleasure of society as a whole by the modern thinkers Bentham and Mill.
However, hedonists are sometimes misunderstood as pursuing only short-term, superficial pleasures, ultimately leading to suffering. Yet equating a hedonistic life with a dissolute existence focused solely on fleeting, sensory pleasures is incorrect. Hedonism aims not for the maximization of temporary pleasures but for the maximization of long-term pleasures, thus differing from the pursuit of only short-term, superficial gratification. For instance, if social achievement promises greater long-term pleasure, a hedonist would prioritize that over immediate, short-term pleasure.
Furthermore, hedonism is often mistakenly perceived as viewing everything other than pleasure as worthless. However, the claim that hedonism considers only pleasure valuable is factually incorrect. There are things in the world besides pleasure that are valuable, and even pain can be evaluated as having instrumental value. Consider, for example, the situation where a foot falls into a fire pit, feels pain, and is immediately withdrawn. The pain experienced here is undoubtedly a good thing. Had the person not felt the pain, they might not have thought to pull their foot out of the fire pit, potentially suffering far greater injury. Of course, the value of this pain is purely instrumental; it does not mean the pain itself is the goal.
Hedonism cannot comprehend the act of pursuing pain as an end in itself, rather than as a means. Even the pain ascetics willingly endure is merely a means to achieve religious or moral fulfillment and satisfaction; pain itself cannot be the goal. Most secular ascetics forgo immediate pleasure for social achievements like wealth or honor, while religious ascetics renounce worldly pleasures for otherworldly rewards. However, whether it is social achievement or otherworldly achievement, ultimately, it all corresponds to an attitude of pursuing pleasure in a broad sense.
It is true that hedonism has been unfairly criticized due to various misunderstandings, but that does not mean hedonism is free from all criticism. Hedonism has several problems related to the definition of pleasure and the method of calculating pleasure. Since the sources of pleasure are extremely diverse, the question arises: can different pleasures truly be considered equivalent? For instance, is the pleasure derived from satisfying hunger the same as that from acquiring social honor? Bentham sought to maintain the consistency of hedonism by answering that these pleasures are qualitatively identical and differ only quantitatively. However, he was criticized by non-hedonists as advocating a “philosophy of pigs,” as he equated the pleasure of a lowly pig with the higher pleasure of a human, effectively treating pigs and humans as equal beings.
Mill, in contrast, argued that an unsatisfied human is better than a satisfied pig, and an unsatisfied Socrates is better than a satisfied fool, acknowledging a qualitative difference in pleasure. However, adopting this position raises the problem of calculation: how can dissimilar pleasures be compared? Mill distinguished between base and superior pleasures by defining the superior pleasure as the one preferred by the majority of people who have experienced both, even if they are dissimilar. He viewed humans as beings who pursue a free and dignified life, and thus considered the higher pleasures that contribute to the realization of this freedom and dignity to be more desirable. However, in relation to this, later hedonists sometimes criticized Mill, arguing that he had abandoned the core tenets of hedonism.