This blog post examines the traditional claim that authority conflicts with rationality alongside Raz’s rebuttal, exploring the conceptual space under which compliance with commands can secure rationality.
The ‘paradox of authority’ typically refers to the assertion that ‘authority’ and ‘rationality’—two elements considered essential to human moral life—are mutually incompatible concepts. A rational act means basing the action on the judgment of the act’s own value. Conversely, acting under authority involves proceeding with an action ‘simply because a command was given,’ irrespective of the action’s inherent value. This structure of practical reasoning—the framework for determining what one ought to do and the reasons for that decision—is thus claimed to be inherently contradictory. Some scholars concluded that the concept of authority, ultimately irreconcilable with rationality, must be abandoned. This is because a rational human being cannot use authority as the basis for their actions and, moreover, would not require authority in the first place. The logic goes: if authority commands the right action, then a command would not have been necessary as a basis for performing the right action; and if it commands the wrong action, then acting on the command cannot be justifiably grounded.
Raz counters this argument as follows: The logic inherent in the paradox of authority is that the structure of practical reasoning (A) presupposed by the concept of authority can never be reconciled with the structure of practical reasoning (B) presupposed by the concept of rationality. Therefore, the notion of being both rational and following authority is a conceptual contradiction akin to a ‘round square’. However, for this logic to hold, there must be no instances (π) where the structure of practical reasoning is A yet the process of performing the action is judged to be rational. If π is presented, the expression “the judgment result regarding the value of the action itself is used as the basis for the action” fails to adequately describe B, thereby undermining the ‘paradox of authority’ based on it. This is because it creates room to reconstruct B in a way that encompasses π without creating a paradox. Accordingly, Raz first presents the following case.
Anne left work after enduring an abnormally intense day of work. That night, a friend called to inform her about an ‘investment opportunity’ she had been researching. This investment proposal had one condition: she had to give a definitive answer by midnight that day. She felt too exhausted to make a proper judgment and ultimately decided not to invest without reviewing the proposal. Anne appears to be acting very rationally, even though she didn’t judge for herself whether her act of rejecting the investment was right, and even though she acted based on reasons unrelated to the value of the act itself. So why does it appear that way?
According to Raz, it’s because Anne’s act is also, in fact, an act performed based on appropriate reasons or grounds. However, the basis here differs from the usual grounds for action that influence the outcome of judging the value of the action itself. Typically, whether to follow the grounds supporting an action or those opposing it—that is, whether to perform the action—is decided by weighing the relative strength or importance of the grounds for action. Anne’s action, however, is determined by a unique basis for action that renders such weighing unnecessary. This can be considered a higher-order basis for action, operating at a level above the usual bases for action and exerting influence such that those bases cannot determine whether the action is performed. Raz calls this an ‘exclusive basis’.
This ‘acting based on an exclusionary ground’ is precisely the structure (A) of practical reasoning found in acting under authority. By its very nature, authority does not leave the decision to act to the judgment of the addressee regarding whether the commanded action is right; the addressee must proceed to act solely because ‘a command was given,’ regardless of the action’s intrinsic value. In other words, the grounds for action that could influence the outcome of judging the value of the commanded act itself are ‘excluded’ from intervening in the process of practical reasoning in acting under authority.
Ultimately, as long as instances of acting based on exclusionary grounds retain persuasive force, one can no longer claim that authority and rationality are conceptually incompatible by relying on the structure of practical reasoning presupposed by the concept of authority. The very conceptual space for actions based on authority to be rational stems from the existence of exclusionary grounds.
