This blog post examines why the advancement of genetic engineering repeatedly leads to dystopian imaginings, critically analyzing how the fears and misunderstandings surrounding human cloning discussions are formed.
In 1997, the cloned sheep ‘Dolly’ was unveiled in Nature. The research that brought Dolly into being was the first instance of creating a genetically identical individual from the somatic cell of a fully grown organism. Dolly became the symbol of ‘cloning technology,’ and as a result, discussions about the other benefits genetic engineering technology could bring were completely overshadowed. Not only the public, but also many scientists and philosophers believe that the ultimate destination of genetic engineering research is the application of the cloning technology that created Dolly to humans. They warn that when that day comes, the value of human diversity will be destroyed and human dignity will collapse. According to their argument, genetic engineering research is nothing more than another ‘Manhattan Project’ that will ultimately pour astronomical resources into creating monsters beyond human control.
However, such arguments often bypass crucial discussions: whether the advancement of genetic engineering technology inevitably leads to human cloning, and whether a human born through cloning can be considered the same being as their genetic duplicate. Furthermore, these arguments are sometimes leveraged by invoking an instinctive aversion to the unfamiliar situation of having an exact duplicate exist alongside oneself, thereby reinforcing the argument. Philosopher Hilary Putnam is a prime example of such arguments. Putnam contends that human cloning must be prohibited because, in a society where it becomes commonplace, families would reject the moral ideals pursued by democratic modern societies. He argues that the future society where human cloning is widely used resembles the Nazi racial policies and the ‘unwanted children legislation’ implemented in Scandinavian countries in the past, which are already accepted as inappropriate. Although Putnam frames this in terms of ‘moral standards,’ an instinctive aversion to cloned humans underlies his argument. He is making forced assumptions to leverage this emotion in his reasoning. It is unwise to dismiss the necessity of research that could benefit all of humanity based on an emotional aversion to specific applications. Therefore, in this article, I will examine and refute Hillary Putnam’s arguments in greater detail.
Putnam envisions a future society where genetic engineering is so commonplace that many couples would use cloning technology to have children ‘genetically identical to themselves’. He argues that this society, where all family members bear a striking resemblance to each other, evokes the same revulsion one feels recalling the Nazi ideal of the blond-haired, blue-eyed family or the past Scandinavian nations where ‘anti-degeneracy’ laws were enforced based on eugenic logic. He contends that in this society, cloned children are not respected as independent human beings but are reduced to objects for realizing the lifestyle their parents desire. This violates Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ that humans should not be treated as mere means to an end. Putnam views diversity and the unpredictability of how children will turn out as essential values necessary for the moral ideal of the family that modern society aspires to. He contends that the normalization of human cloning not only undermines this moral foundation but also conflicts with the moral foundation of the entire democratic society composed of such families.
However, Putnam’s argument can be refuted on several points.
First, the future society Putnam envisions—one where most parents choose to have a child who is a clone of one of them—lacks realism. In Putnam’s hypothetical dystopia, parents routinely use human cloning to obtain children who are exact replicas of themselves. However, as genetic engineering technology advances, it is highly likely that it will go beyond simple cloning to enable genetic manipulation during the embryonic stage. This would not only eliminate genetic disease factors but also allow active control over genes unrelated to disease. Should such technology be developed, demand would likely increase for manipulating a child’s genes to ensure superior traits. Nevertheless, Putnam asserts that human cloning will become mainstream simply because parents desire children who resemble them. While most parents feel affection for children who resemble them, the likelihood that they would want children who are their exact duplicates is low. Parents would likely want their children to be born with better traits, even if they resemble them slightly less, to lead more advantageous lives. Consequently, Putnam’s assumption lacks realism, and it appears he overused provocative imagery to emphasize the dystopia he envisioned. Families composed of children who are identical to their parents have never existed, so we feel a sense of strangeness and repulsion when imagining them. This is because modern individuals have been educated to value the uniqueness and diversity of the individual, distinct from others. Putnam skips over key questions—such as whether genetic engineering will actually lead to human cloning, or whether identical genetic traits mean identical humans—and instead stirs readers’ emotions to sway them toward his position.
Second, there is no basis to claim that giving birth to a cloned child violates that child’s dignity. Putnam argues that human cloning violates Kantian morality, stating that cloned humans have their self-determination infringed upon because they are born with predetermined genetic traits. However, human cloning cannot be seen as depriving that child of self-determination. The identity of a child born through somatic cell cloning is formed after cloning. Without human cloning, that child could not have been born at all; rather, through the process of cloning, it gained the opportunity to live as a human being. Furthermore, humans born through natural conception also receive a combination of genes independent of their own will and live under their influence. From the child’s perspective, the genes conferred through cloning and those obtained through natural conception are indistinguishable. Therefore, Putnam’s argument contains a contradiction: it must apply equally to all humans, including those born naturally. The claim that cloned children become tools for realizing the lifestyle desired by their parents is also problematic. Putnam cites Lewontin’s argument—that in capitalist society, people treat each other as objects—but refutes it by pointing out that the attitude an employer has toward an employee differs from the attitude one has toward a tool. Putnam thus acknowledges that even within capitalist relations, humans cannot be treated purely as tools. Extending this logic, even a cloned child, as long as it interacts with others as a human being possessing free will, cannot be viewed by its parents solely as a tool for achieving their own purposes.
While it is possible to criticize parents for perceiving their child instrumentally during the decision-making process to have a child through cloning, at this stage, the parents are merely dealing with the ‘possibility’ of having a child who does not yet exist—furthermore, an entity whose status as a human being has not yet been determined. Once that possibility materializes and the child is born, it is self-evident that the child, born as a human being, cannot be viewed as a mere tool, as explained above.
Third, the basis for viewing the diversity and unpredictability of children as essential to the moral ideal of a desirable family is weak. In modern society, the practice of forming families through choice is already widely accepted. Adoption is a prime example. Generally, adoptive parents prefer children of their own race and can also choose the child’s gender. Adoption is an entirely artificial choice made through procedures, yet it is accepted as a normal and legitimate way to form a new family. While adopting without considering gender, race, or disability is often seen as a noble choice, adoption achieved through selection does not diminish the meaning of family. Furthermore, marriage itself is an act of forming a family through choice. As these examples show, the moral significance of family does not fade simply because new family members lack diversity or unpredictability. From this perspective, the spread of human cloning merely represents the emergence of a new way to gain family members. There is no absolute reason to deem the diversity and unpredictability arising solely from random gamete division and fertilization as sacred.
We have examined the inherent flaws in Hilary Putnam’s arguments against human cloning. Putnam constructs unrealistic hypothetical scenarios to sway readers’ emotions in his favor and builds his arguments upon them. Putnam’s claim that cloned humans would be deprived of the right to determine their own lives from birth, and that parents would treat their cloned children instrumentally rather than as individuals, is either logically contradictory or inconsistent with his other arguments. Finally, the diversity and unpredictability of children, which Putnam emphasizes as intrinsic values, are difficult to view as essential elements for family morality. Refuting Putnam’s view does not mean I support human cloning. I merely wish to emphasize that arguments based on unrealistic assumptions should not block challenges to a technology that could profoundly impact humanity’s future. I believe that only when we discuss the future brought by human cloning technology based on realistic blueprints can we seriously examine its positive effects, side effects, and the ethical issues we will face during its realization.
