In this blog post, we will look at various interpretations of the unique structure of medieval Western European farmland, where private ownership and sharing coexisted, and the reasons for its persistence.
The typical form of agricultural land ownership in medieval Western Europe was the so-called “open field system.” This system had no clear fences or boundaries, allowing farmers to freely cross between each other’s fields. The land owned by a single farmer was not concentrated in one place but was divided into small, irregular pieces scattered over a wide area. In this type of land structure, the community coordinated the cultivation of the same crops on adjacent plots of land, so that sowing and harvesting took place at almost the same time. This measure was not simply for administrative convenience. The purpose was to restore soil fertility by allowing livestock to graze collectively on land that was fallow after the harvest and using their manure as natural fertilizer. In other words, it reflected a community-based approach to the shared use and maintenance of land.
If that was the case, why did they divide the farmland into small plots instead of simply putting up fences? To answer this question, medieval historians since the 19th century have sought the cause in the communal sentiment of seeking equity in land ownership, taking into account factors such as “fair plowing” and “differences in fertility.” In other words, they argued that the scattered farmland structure was formed as a way to equalize the quality of land by dividing unequal land equally.
However, in the 1970s, economic historian Deirdre McCloskey approached this issue in a completely different way. Like previous scholars, she agreed that agricultural productivity was lower when farmland was scattered rather than concentrated in one place, but she questioned the sustainability of this system.
In other words, he focused on how a land structure that was considered inefficient could have been maintained for so long. McCloskey found the answer in the economic concept of “risk diversification,” or a kind of insurance effect. According to his explanation, agriculture is an industry that is inherently susceptible to pests, diseases, and climatic conditions.
In particular, even within a relatively small area, crop yields can vary greatly due to differences in terrain, soil, sunlight, and rainfall. Therefore, if a particular farmer concentrates all of his land in one place, a local crop failure in that area could jeopardize the entire harvest. On the other hand, if farming is distributed across scattered fields in different areas, even if the harvest is poor in one area, the loss can be offset by the harvest in other areas. This was a strategy to ensure stability by spreading the risks inherent in agricultural activities, similar to the proverb, “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket.” From this perspective, the loss of production caused by scattered farmland can be seen as a kind of insurance premium.
However, there have been counterarguments to this claim. Notable among them is economic historian Penoaltia, who pointed out that grains are storable crops and argued that other methods, such as grain storage and mutual trade, were sufficient to prepare for the risk of temporary crop failures. He believed that the scattered farmland structure was actually an institutional mechanism that increased the efficiency of agricultural production. In particular, he emphasized the importance of performing work on the most suitable land according to the time of day and weather conditions in relation to the distribution of agricultural labor. For example, on rainy days like today, work should be done in areas with good drainage, and on sunny days like tomorrow, work should be done in shaded areas. Selectively utilizing land with various conditions can maximize labor efficiency. In other words, scattered farmland was not simply a means of insurance, but rather a production strategy that allowed for flexible responses depending on time and conditions.
On the other hand, Dalman explained the sustainability of scattered farmland from another perspective. He saw this structure as closely related to communal grazing. In medieval rural societies, it was very common to graze livestock during the fallow period after cultivation, and this was an activity carried out by the entire village. However, if a farmer fenced off his land, it would greatly interfere with the communal grazing of other farmers. Therefore, it was necessary to refrain from installing fences for the common good, and the measure to institutionally support this was to scatter the farmland. Dalman interpreted this as an attempt to prevent the “tragedy of the anti-commons.”
The concept of the “anti-commons tragedy” describes a situation in which a group of people each have rights to private property, but the resources are only efficient when used collectively. In this case, the procedural problem of obtaining consent from all rights holders can prevent the efficient use of resources. This is the opposite of the “tragedy of the commons.” The tragedy of shared resources is a phenomenon in which resources that are freely accessible to anyone are overused and depleted. If excessive abuse is the problem in the tragedy of shared resources, then excessive access restrictions are the problem in the tragedy of semi-shared resources. Dalman interpreted that by scattering the farmland, it became difficult for farmers to build fences arbitrarily, thereby maintaining the communal benefit of communal grazing.
In addition, legal scholar Henry E. Smith shed new light on the scattered open field system through the concept of the “tragedy of the semi-commons.” He viewed the open fields of medieval Europe as a typical example of a resource with complex attributes, combining private ownership and public use. In other words, the same land functioned as both private and shared land depending on the season. For example, during the sowing and harvesting seasons, individual farmers used their plots privately, but after the harvest, the entire land was used collectively for grazing livestock. In such a structure, it is easy for opportunistic behavior to arise, whereby certain farmers seek to maximize the benefits of communal grazing—such as concentrating livestock manure on their own land—while encouraging others to engage in activities that are detrimental to cultivation, such as allowing livestock to run around and damage other people’s land. Smith believed that the solution chosen by the community to solve this problem was to “scatter the land.” By dividing the land into small, irregular pieces and dispersing them, it became difficult for individuals to act opportunistically to benefit themselves or harm others, thereby promoting the fair and stable use of resources.
