This blog post addresses the human rights abuses perpetrated in North Korean political prison camps. It also explores whether the international community can condone these abuses under the banner of cultural relativism.
From 6 a.m. to 9 p.m., they mine coal or chop wood. No food is provided, and various forms of violence and malice pour down as if it were natural. It might seem like the image of hell described in various religions, but surprisingly, this is the daily life of 100,000 people imprisoned in North Korean political prison camps. North Korean citizens endure food shortages that threaten their very survival. They are denied even the freedom to hum a foreign song, let alone travel, participate in politics, or engage in other basic human activities. The international community, including the UN, has persistently urged North Korea to cease these human rights abuses. Yet, North Korea maintains a consistent stance that imposing “Western-style human rights perspectives” on their culture is unjust.
Cultural relativism, which holds that imposing culture is wrong because each culture has its own unique values, helps resolve inter-ethnic conflicts and protect minority groups. In the past, European imperialists discovered the New World, turned it into colonies, enslaved the indigenous peoples, and exploited their resources. To justify these actions, they imposed the value system that their own race was inherently superior upon the colonized peoples, even mobilizing scientific research findings. As a reflection on this, cultural relativism emerged within American anthropology in the 1930s. It pointed out the error of the practice of judging their cultures, which possessed unique value systems, solely by Western standards, and called for tolerance towards other cultures.
However, justifying all human rights abuses on the grounds that every culture possesses inherent values leads to an overwhelming number of victims of brutal tragedies. The concept of ‘Asian values’ advocated by Singapore’s dictator Lee Kuan Yew posits that there exists a distinct Eastern human rights framework distinct from the individualistic Western concept of human rights. This ideology is being used as a basis to justify brutal human rights violations in authoritarian states like China and Malaysia. Globally, 200 million women have endured female genital mutilation (FGM), causing unbearable pain and complications. Despite being outlawed, this practice continues openly under the guise of cultural difference. In our own country, discriminatory attitudes toward LGBTI individuals are so pervasive that they are difficult for the general public to overcome, and those who point this out face relentless opposition rallies by certain religious groups.
Therefore, while it is undeniable that the values of other cultures must be respected in their own right, I argue that in certain cases, the imposition of culture can be justified. Specifically, I will contend that empirical research on universal human sentiments can serve as a basis for justifying the prohibition of certain cultural practices. To this end, I will first demonstrate that universal sentiments exist across all cultures. Next, I will apply these universal sentiments as criteria for cultural judgment and provide answers to possible objections. Finally, I will clarify that the prejudice that ‘coercion is fundamentally wrong’ is itself a bias, and present grounds for coercion.
For cultural coercion to be justified, one must explain why the coercing culture is superior to the coerced culture without relying on the values of any specific culture. Concepts like human rights or freedom, currently in use, originate from Western culture, making them insufficient on their own to judge the merits of specific cultures. However, if there exists an emotion common to all humanity, this sentiment could serve as a criterion for discerning the quality of cultures. Therefore, this paper will first confirm the existence of universal sentiment and then argue that this sentiment can indeed be used as a standard for cultural judgment.
First, I believe we can find universal emotions through factual research into the natural scientific environment we all share. For example, all humanity has lived on Earth, where night and day alternate in a 24-hour cycle without exception. We survive by consuming air, water, and nutrients, and by forming societies, we have acquired mechanisms of aggression and love that operate at a biological level. While some emotions may be shaped by acquired factors from cultural customs, at least some emotions are formed from innate biological factors. These must be characteristics applicable to everyone, regardless of culture.
Indeed, numerous scientific studies indicate that at least some emotions are universal, irrespective of culture. Facial expressions corresponding to six basic emotions—happiness, fear, sadness, etc.—appear universally across all cultures, even in congenital blind individuals who have never seen their own or others’ expressions. The phenomenon of naturally mimicking another’s emotions is universally present in all humans and even appears in primates, who are more distant from us than any two human cultures.
An example of universal emotion is the aversion to pain and threat. Avoiding pain increases survival probability from an evolutionary perspective and is found in many animals, including humans. Indeed, this emotion is observed even in cultures rife with violence. In Yanomami villages, warfare is constant, women routinely suffer violence, and victorious villages kill the children of their opponents. Yet extensive observation reveals they do not relish violence: women flee in terror when threatened, and men become gripped by fear during war. Ultimately, their participation in attacks appears to be a result of social pressure.
Before concluding the discussion on universal emotions, I wish to emphasize that while this universality applies broadly enough to encompass all of humanity today, it presupposes our current natural and biological environment. That is, if the environment changes, universal emotions can also change. Modern science has discovered that the blueprint for humanity is encoded in DNA and has confirmed the possibility of altering that DNA at will through genetic engineering. In other words, there appears to be no insurmountable technological barrier preventing the creation of superhumans. If genetic engineering enables most humans to freely regulate their own pain and fear, universal emotions must also change accordingly.
Next, universal emotions can serve as a criterion for judging the merits of cultures because, although proposed externally, they occupy a certain part of their own value systems. We cannot judge cultures based on criteria like human rights and freedom because these are values inherent to our own culture. However, universal emotions, by definition, are found in all cultures and must therefore occupy a certain part of their unique value systems. Consequently, the criterion of universal emotions cannot be questioned for legitimacy in any culture on the grounds that it is an external value.
To assess the practicality of this criterion, let us examine actual cases and possible counterarguments. As a first case, we can judge that dictatorships like North Korea oppressing their citizens’ human rights is wrong because it violates the universal sentiment yearning for freedom and stability. Numerous studies have proven that when individuals cannot control their environment, it induces an extreme biological stress response harmful to health. This holds true for rats, as well as primates and humans. These findings support the notion that cultures fostering anxiety about sudden arrest and forcibly restricting desired actions run counter to the emotions of their residents. Indeed, the desire of citizens in authoritarian states for freer and more stable lives is confirmed by the persistent, widespread democratic movements occurring everywhere.
As a second example, practices like female genital mutilation (FGM) and honor killings occurring in some cultures can be judged as wrong based on the universal emotion of wanting to avoid suffering. As discussed earlier, the aversion to pain is universally present at a biological level, supporting that these customs run counter to the emotions of their members. Some might argue that since only some members suffer, these practices do not violate the emotions of all members. However, this fails to recognize that perpetrators and victims belong to distinct subcultures within the same society. Even within the same culture, one group embodies the culture of perpetration while the other embodies the culture of victimization; thus, they must be distinguished. Following this logic, perpetrators are imposing a culture that runs counter to the emotions of victims, providing grounds to argue it is unjust.
The first possible counterargument is that violence and selfishness are also universal emotions. In this case, violent emotions oppose the emotion of not wanting to be subjected to violence. When different universal emotions clash, one must determine which manifests more powerfully. The emotion of avoiding violence is directly linked to survival, whereas the emotion of wanting to inflict violence is only indirectly related through the goal of achieving a higher social class. This provides grounds for arguing that the emotion of not wanting to be subjected to violence is biologically stronger. Furthermore, violence hinders the formation of stable societies, thus also conflicting with the emotion of seeking a stable life, which further weakens the relative intensity of violent emotions.
A second possible counterargument points out that even if a culture fails to guarantee universal emotions, there may still be cases where individuals do not wish for that culture to cease. Indeed, many citizens of authoritarian states sincerely praise their dictators in every way, and while a minority, some women do not oppose FGM. This misunderstanding overlooks the fact that culture, by its nature, must apply to many people simultaneously, not just individuals. The misunderstanding can be resolved by distinguishing whether some or all of the people who are victims want the culture to continue.
First, if only some of the affected members want the culture preserved, it is unjust for the other side to force the violation of the universal sentiments of those who do not want it. Therefore, the judgment that the culture is bad gains legitimacy. However, this judgment does not imply that voluntary participation is inherently bad. The existence of unwilling victims signifies that the culture imposes something, and the judgment that an imposing culture is bad means it must allow room for self-choice.
Next, if all affected members genuinely desire preservation—assuming such a case actually exists—it would only serve as evidence that the factual judgment about the universal sentiment was mistaken. As mentioned earlier, universal sentiments manifest at a biological level common to all humanity. Therefore, while it’s possible for two sentiments to conflict or for some individuals to have weaker sentiments, it’s nearly impossible for every person within a cultural sphere to sincerely desire its violation. If one encounters a case that seems to contradict this, the value of that culture perceived as infringing upon the universal sentiment must be linked to another, relatively stronger universal sentiment. That is, judging by the standard of universal sentiment, that culture can be deemed not bad, and thus it does not constitute a counterexample to the standard of universal sentiment.
Thus far, we have judged the merits of several cultures using the standard of universal sentiment. However, the value judgment that a culture is undesirable is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the value judgment that its cessation can be compelled. Therefore, assuming we have identified an undesirable culture, we will discuss whether its cessation can be compelled. To do this, we will first refute the common misconception that cultural compulsion is inherently unjust, then present grounds justifying compulsion.
First, I wish to point out that the conservative reaction claiming cultural coercion is unethical stems from a misunderstanding of logical relationships. Cultural relativism makes two claims. The first is the factual observation that there is no common value system across cultures. The second is the argument that because the first observation holds, one must adopt an attitude of tolerance toward other cultures. At first glance, this seems plausible, but they overlook a logical fact: one cannot derive the value judgment ‘tolerance is required’ from the factual judgment ‘there is no common value system’. That is, the latter value judgment requires the involvement of a different value system beyond the former factual judgment.
An analogy makes this easier to understand. Just as stopping a high school student smoking on the street is a moral decision, choosing to look the other way is also a moral judgment. People from certain cultures may believe their own culture is superior, but this can conflict with universal sensibilities. Similarly, while they may enjoy smoking, the fact that it harms their health is a verifiable truth. Assuming there is no retaliation for intervention and that intervention requires only pressing a button, while some might choose to stand by, no one would claim that standing by is the obvious choice. In fact, there is significant criticism of broadcasters and Wikipedia for maintaining a mechanical neutrality from the bystander’s perspective, even regarding values that are not objectively neutral.
Furthermore, imposing one’s culture can be justified by the sentiment that one would not want to be treated that way oneself. The “veil of ignorance” serves as a methodology for judging whether a system aligns with justice, positing that systems established through free contracts without knowing one’s social class or position are closer to justice. According to this, pressing a button to stop a high school student smoking while passing by can be justified by the sorrow that the addicted subject could be oneself or one’s family. Similarly, forcing the cessation of a culture that suppresses universal sentiment can be justified by the anxiety that one might also be suppressed within such a culture.
Some might counter that this standard of justice is not universal. However, this is a misunderstanding of the situation; since we are the ones imposing the coercion, we must judge its legitimacy by our own value system. The reason we previously considered universal standards is that the actions of people from other cultures follow their own value systems; we cannot judge our own actions by theirs. Shouldn’t the decision to stop a high school student from smoking harmful cigarettes be based on our values, not theirs? If we were to demand cessation of our culture in a society lacking such standards of justice, claiming ours is wrong, then justification based on their values would be necessary.
The legitimacy of cultural imposition has been a primary point of contention for countless human rights activists and powerful figures over the past century—sometimes in the hands of scholars lamenting the oppression of ethnic minorities, sometimes in the hands of dictators trampling human rights. While anthropologists have revealed that each culture possesses its own unique value system, leading the world to recognize the need for tolerance toward other cultures, this understanding has also been exploited by politicians as a tool to justify brutal human rights abuses.
This paper sought to find justification for cultural imposition through universal emotions shared by all humanity. First, it demonstrated that natural science research can identify emotions universal to Homo sapiens. Next, it examined whether these universal emotions can serve as a standard for judging culture. Finally, to justify coercive acts, it pointed out that non-coercion is not value-neutral and presented ethical grounds for legitimizing coercion.
It is wrong to despise others simply because their culture differs or because their actions seem strange when measured against one’s own values. However, it is equally wrong to tolerate atrocities that no human being should commit, merely because they stem from a different culture. As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, hailed as a historic milestone in the struggle for human dignity, strongly warns in its final clause: “Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”
