In this blog post, we will examine the subjectivity and objectivity of aesthetic value judgments and the relativism that connects them.
When we make aesthetic value judgments such as “Mona Lisa is beautiful,” what are we actually asserting? This question involves complex philosophical issues that go beyond simple admiration. If such judgments are merely expressions of subjective feelings, why do we speak of them as if they were objective facts? Conversely, if beauty is an attribute of the work itself, why do people emphasize subjectivity by saying, “It is beautiful to me”?
This question leads to the question of the nature of aesthetic value. Is aesthetic value an attribute of an object, like its size or material? Or does it exist only in the experience of the perceiver? Based on these questions, philosophers have proposed two main theories: objectivism and subjectivism. However, these two positions are irreconcilable extremes, and each has serious theoretical flaws. As a result, a relativist position that attempts to integrate these two extremes has recently been gaining attention.
Relativism begins with the starting point of objectivism. In other words, it accepts that aesthetic value judgments are not simply the feelings of the speaker, but rather statements about the object itself, i.e., the work of art. However, relativists also accept subjectivism by emphasizing that value cannot be completely unrelated to human experience.
In short, relativism is a theory that understands aesthetic value in the interaction between humans and objects, and attempts to consider both the objectivity and subjectivity of aesthetic judgment. From this perspective, C.S. Lewis, a representative thinker, analyzes aesthetic value in a more sophisticated manner. Lewis first distinguishes aesthetic value into the objective attributes of an object and the subjective feelings of the perceiver.
He sees a “good experience” as one that has intrinsic value, whether we describe it as “pleasant,” “satisfying,” or “moving.” Intrinsic value contrasts with instrumental value. Instrumental value refers to value as a means to another end, while intrinsic value refers to something that is good in and of itself.
According to Lewis, objects themselves cannot have intrinsic value in the strict sense. Only direct experience can be intrinsically good. In other words, we can only judge something as good or bad when it causes us pleasure or pain. From this, Lewis introduces another concept related to intrinsic value: inherent value. He believes that when an object in an aesthetic experience immediately evokes intrinsic value without any mediation, that object has inherent value. Therefore, all aesthetic objects can be said to have inherent value.
In this context, Lewis’s theory of aesthetic value encompasses both objective and subjective elements. He defines aesthetic value as follows. Aesthetic value is the potential or possibility of an object to be experienced as having intrinsic value. This definition does not reduce aesthetic value to an absolute attribute or a mere personal feeling. Rather, it is understood as a relational attribute that is revealed in interaction with humans. In other words, an object reveals its aesthetic value only when it is perceived, but its potential remains in the object even when it is not actually perceived. In this respect, relativism is one step closer to objectivism.
However, an important question arises here. If the aesthetic value of a work is revealed only when it evokes pleasant or satisfying emotions in the person experiencing it, how can we explain that the same work gives pleasure to A but causes discomfort to B? This question threatens the objectivity of aesthetic value judgments and is where subjective interpretations come into play.
Subjectivism understands aesthetic value judgments as self-reports such as “I like this.” Such statements cannot be wrong because individuals know their own feelings best. On the other hand, relativists understand the judgment “This is beautiful” in a more complex way. In other words, this judgment is not merely an expression of emotion, but is considered a kind of empirical prediction that the object will cause a similar aesthetic experience in other people. In other words, aesthetic judgments are not mere impressions, but imply the expectation or inference that those impressions will be shared by others.
The important point here is that such predictions are not mere assumptions, but their validity may vary depending on empirical evidence. For example, a work that has impressed many people over a long period of time and has been positively evaluated in various cultures is more likely to impress future viewers. Therefore, relativists believe that not all aesthetic judgments are equal. In other words, the claim that all tastes should be equally respected is a misinterpretation of aesthetic relativism, and Lewis’s position is that there is a difference between good taste and bad taste.
Furthermore, Lewis points out the following. The statement “I like this music right now” is true at that moment. However, the judgment “This music will continue to make me feel good” is a prediction based on experience and may be wrong later. In this regard, Lewis argues that one’s feelings alone cannot be the basis for an objective judgment that the music is “good.”
In short, Lewis’s relativistic position does not reduce aesthetic value judgments to mere subjective feelings, nor does it regard them as absolute and universal attributes. He sees aesthetic value as a characteristic of objects that have the potential to be found in individual experiences. This potential is revealed only through interaction with humans, and the more such interactions are repeated and accumulated, the more solid the aesthetic value of the work becomes.
Aesthetic value is not simply an expression of subjective emotion, nor is it an absolute and unchanging attribute of an object. It is a relational and experiential value that emerges from the interaction between humans and objects, and even personal impressions can be objectified within certain conditions and contexts to form a framework for prediction and evaluation. Lewis’s theory exquisitely captures this complex point and builds a theoretical bridge that transcends the two extremes of classical aesthetics.
Therefore, when we say, “This is beautiful,” it is not merely a report of personal feelings, but also implies the expectation and belief that beauty can be shared, as well as the experiential history and cultural context that support that expectation. This relativistic approach allows us to think about aesthetic judgments in a richer, more open, and more persuasive way.
This is a more sophisticated and deeper understanding of aesthetic value judgments, and it is the starting point for the philosophical reflection we should have when discussing art and beauty.
