In this blog post, we will examine the standards of legal interpretation and actual cases, focusing on the differences between legal interpretation and textual interpretation.

The difference between legal interpretation and textual interpretation: the intentions of legislators and the validity of laws

In law, “interpretation” does not simply mean understanding the meaning of a law. Legal interpretation is the process of determining how laws should be understood and applied in reality, and is clearly distinct from simply clarifying the “intent” behind the creation of laws. This point becomes clearer when compared to philological interpretation.
Philological interpretation involves examining a piece of literature or philosophical text to explore the intentions of the author at the time of its creation.
In other words, philology deals with perceptions of what is perceived and focuses on revealing the subjective thoughts of the author reflected in the work, that is, what real people thought in reality. To this end, researchers analyze various materials left behind by the author, such as drafts, diaries, and letters, to uncover the author’s “true” intentions. This is a method of interpretation based entirely on experience. However, legal interpretation deviates from this approach.
Legal interpretation does not simply retrace the thoughts of the legislators. Rather, the purpose of interpretation is to clarify how legal provisions have objectively valid meanings in today’s reality. Laws are not written by a single author. They are created jointly by numerous legislators, each with different political, social, and moral backgrounds. Therefore, the legislators may not agree on every single provision.
Nevertheless, since laws are norms that maintain social order, their interpretation requires a single meaning rather than multiple meanings. At this point, an important premise emerges. The “intention of the legislator” is not considered to be the complex thoughts and intentions of actual human beings, but rather a single consciousness ideologically constructed to secure the normative legitimacy of the law.
In other words, regardless of the intentions of those who participated in the actual legislative process, we interpret laws based on their meaning. Therefore, the intention of the legislator is not a “means” of interpretation, but rather the ‘goal’ and “result” that interpretation must achieve.
Legal interpretation is based on the a priori demand to understand the entire legal system systematically and without contradiction. As a result, even meanings and circumstances that were completely unknown to the legislators at the time of enactment may be considered to be the intention of the legislators. Interpreters can understand legal provisions more clearly and deeply than the legislators who enacted them, and may even reach the conclusion that they would have enacted them in the same way if they had been legislators themselves.
In this way, legal interpretation is based on textual interpretation, but it does not stop there; it goes beyond it. If textual interpretation traces the thoughts of empirical authors, jurisprudence is an attempt to construct the valid will of ideological legislators. Ultimately, empirical legislators retreat from the realm of interpretation, and ideological legislators based on the internal logic and system of the law take their place.
Trials can be considered specific procedures in which such legal interpretation is actually applied. In particular, the importance of interpretation is further emphasized in constitutional review, where interpretation directly affects the existence of a law. The following is a case that illustrates this point well.

Case Analysis: Constitutional Court’s Interpretation of “Obscene Material for Youth”

Mr. A posted a picture on his website showing the main character (a youth character) of a comic book with his entire body exposed. In response, the prosecution charged Mr. A, determining that the picture fell under the category of “obscene material for youth” as defined in Article 2, Item 3 of the Act on the Protection of Youth from Sexual Demeanor and Sexual Abuse.
The relevant provision is defined as follows.

“Materials for the sexual abuse of minors refers to materials that depict minors engaging in acts listed in item 2 of this article, or that express obscene content by explicitly exposing all or part of the body in a manner that causes shame to minors, in the form of films, videos, games, or images transmitted through computers or other communication media.”

The issue was whether the phrase “appearing in” in this provision was connected to the phrase “explicitly exposing all or part of the body.” In other words, there were differing interpretations as to whether the provision applies only when actual juveniles appear or whether it also includes virtual characters depicting juveniles. If the latter is included, it was argued that the provision is overly broad and vague, and therefore unconstitutional as it violates the principle of clarity in criminal law.
The Constitutional Court ruled on this issue based on the following arguments. First, the explanatory memorandum to the bill confirmed that the law was motivated by social concerns about the production and distribution of obscene materials involving juveniles and that it focused on protecting “actual juveniles.” The Court also noted that other provisions in the same law consistently maintained a system for protecting the personal information of actual juveniles.
Furthermore, although the draft legislation included the term “pictures” after “films, videos, and games,” this term was deleted from the final bill. This reveals the legislature’s intention to exclude non-realistic expressions such as comics and illustrations from the scope of the law and to regulate them through general criminal law.
Ultimately, based on the legislative purpose, the process, and the systematic harmony with related provisions, the Constitutional Court ruled that “obscene material for youth” is established only when actual youth appear in the material. This interpretation confirms that the law does not violate the principle of clarity by eliminating the possibility of ambiguous interpretation.

Conclusion: The essence and social significance of legal interpretation

Law is a key mechanism for maintaining social order and regulating the rights and obligations of citizens. Therefore, the process of interpreting the law requires more than simply understanding the literal meaning of words; it requires more structured and systematic thinking. Legal interpretation does not merely follow the intent of the legislator, but seeks to ensure that the law functions reasonably and justly in reality.
As seen in the above cases, the authority of interpretation transcends the imperfect expressions and intentions of legislators. Legal interpreters are responsible for uncovering the principles and systems hidden behind legal provisions and thereby realizing justice. Such serious efforts at interpretation ultimately form an important foundation for the rule of law in our society.