In this blog post, we take an in-depth look at the relationship between science and morality, focusing on naturalistic ethics and Moore’s criticism.

Naturalistic ethics, Moore’s criticism, and beyond

In ethics, naturalism is the view that moral values and norms are identical to or reducible to natural facts.
Naturalism seeks to find the basis of morality in objective and empirical facts, that is, facts that can be scientifically verified. This perspective gained significant attention in the late 19th century, when science emerged as the primary means of understanding human life. In 1859, after Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species, philosopher Herbert Spencer proposed a moral theory based on the theory of evolution.
He interpreted Darwin’s theory of evolution in his own way and argued that if an act is “more evolved,” then it is morally better. From Spencer’s point of view, the concept of “survival of the fittest” went beyond a simple biological explanation and became an ethical basis for justifying competition in human society. At the time, his argument was accepted as a novel and powerful theory that linked the latest scientific theories and ethics.
However, in 1903, British philosopher G. E. Moore strongly criticized this naturalistic position in his book Principia Ethica. He defined all attempts to reduce moral concepts to natural facts as “naturalistic fallacies” and argued that they were philosophically flawed.
Moore explains the naturalistic fallacy with the following logic. If you ask someone, “Is A A?”, the question is self-evident and meaningless. This is because it is simply repeating the same thing. On the other hand, the question “Is A B?” has meaning because it raises the question of whether A and B are the same or not.
However, if, as Spencer argues, “more evolved” means “good,” that is, if the two have the same meaning, then the question “Is something more evolved good?” becomes meaningless, like “Is something good good?” Nevertheless, this question is still accepted as a meaningful question. This is because when we hear this question, we can ask, “Is that really true?” and it is debatable in itself. Therefore, Moore concludes that the natural attribute of “being more evolved” and the moral value of “being good” are not the same.
Moore’s argument can be applied not only to Spencer but also to all attempts to reduce moral concepts to natural concepts, and it marked a turning point in ethics. If his argument is accepted, moral values become concepts independent of natural facts, and therefore science, including evolutionary theory, cannot directly influence moral issues.
However, scholars later criticized Moore for not accurately understanding the intentions of naturalists. For Moore’s criticism to be valid, it must be assumed that Spencer attempted to define the concept of “good.”
However, Spencer did not attempt to define “goodness,” but rather to use evolutionary theory to determine “what is good” in reality. In other words, Spencer did not explore the definition (intension) of the concept, but rather attempted to explain its extension. There is an example that helps to understand this context.
The sentence “Chunwon is Chunwon” is self-evident to everyone and does not raise any questions. On the other hand, the sentence “Chunwon is Lee Kwang-soo” may raise the question, “Is that really true?” and in fact, one may not know that the two names refer to the same person. Here, ‘Chunwon’ and “Lee Kwang-soo” are not the same as definitions, but the two names refer to the same entity. Similarly, it is possible to argue that “more evolved” and “good” can have the same meaning even if they are not defined identically.
This counterargument makes it difficult to see Moore’s anti-naturalism argument as necessarily correct. As a result, as Spencer suggested, the door is reopened to the possibility that evolutionary theory and other natural scientific theories may have some influence on moral value judgments.
However, another criticism arises here. It is pointed out that Spencer misinterpreted Darwin’s theory of evolution. According to Darwin’s theory, evolution is not a process that proceeds toward a certain goal. Natural selection merely explains that organisms that are better suited to their environment are more likely to survive and reproduce, but it does not make value judgments such as “better” or “higher.” Therefore, the expression “more evolved” is scientifically inaccurate, which means that attempts to reduce “more evolved” to “good” cannot be justified.
Nevertheless, we can still refer to natural facts when making moral judgments. Facts revealed in various natural sciences, such as biology, psychology, and neuroscience, can provide practical information for moral decisions. However, it is important to note that not all natural facts can be directly converted into moral values. The facts must be scientifically verified and proven to be related to moral values in some way.

In conclusion

Naturalistic ethics is an attempt to find moral standards from scientific facts. The debate over whether this is possible is a very deep and complex topic in the history of philosophy, and it is still actively discussed today. Moore’s criticism provided important insights, but subsequent counterarguments have also opened up the possibility that naturalism should not be completely ruled out. How morality should intersect with science is not a mere theoretical question, but an important task that affects practical ethics, policy-making, and the formation of social values. We are still faced with this question, and the answer is still being sought.