This blog post delves deeply into how we should establish animal rights and moral boundaries when animal cloning research is conducted for human benefit.
Interest in cloning surged when Ian Wilmut created the cloned sheep Dolly. However, since then, voices calling for greater awareness of bioethics have also grown louder. Yet, the moral consideration for the animals subjected to so many experiments and the potential for cloning has not been particularly strong. Ian Coleman stated in his lecture:
“Finally, one might ask whether nuclear replacement research on animals absolutely had to be conducted, and further, whether it should continue. The answer must be an unequivocal yes. As Wilmut clearly stated, the potential for cloning work on non-human animals to provide beneficial solutions to many problems that cause suffering to humans is vast.”
However, social awareness of animal rights has recently increased. As someone who considers animal rights, I believe animal cloning raises ethical concerns and wish to refute this position.
What exactly are animal rights? To answer this question, let’s first examine Peter Singer’s theory of animal liberation. Animal liberation does not literally mean freeing animals from zoo cages or farms. The liberation they advocate involves a fundamental shift in everyday thinking: recognizing that animals too deserve moral consideration and ensuring they receive treatment commensurate with that status. To examine whether animals should be subjects of moral consideration, it is best to start with the question: Why do humans have rights? We live hearing the phrase “All humans have rights” so frequently that we take it for granted. Then why can’t animals enjoy rights like humans? Is it simply because they are not human? Is it because humans are superior to animals? If humans possess more abilities than animals, what specific abilities justify humans’ superior rights? Several arguments exist on this point.
The first is language. However, language alone cannot serve as the basis for rights. Since the 1970s, the Language Research Institute at Georgia State University has reported that bonobos acquire basic language skills, and whales and dolphins also possess mutual communication abilities. Furthermore, if language were the criterion for rights, then non-verbal individuals with disabilities would have to be excluded from moral consideration.
The second argument is that only humans are considered moral agents. However, this is not entirely correct. Animals also possess the capacity for empathy, which plays a crucial role in moral judgment. In this regard, James Rachels cites an experiment conducted at Northwestern University. In the experiment, a significant number of rhesus monkeys chose to go hungry for several days rather than administer a strong electric shock to a fellow monkey. Such choices by the monkeys could be considered empathetic behavior, a core element of morality. Furthermore, infants, the mentally ill, or the mentally disabled are difficult to regard as moral agents; if the initial assumption were true, they would lack moral rights.
The third argument is that human intelligence surpasses that of animals. However, if intelligence becomes the criterion for rights, this would justify creating hierarchies of rights even within the human population. Consequently, some unfortunate humans with lower intelligence than animals would be unable to exercise their rights as human beings.
The fourth is human rationality. This raises questions about the overall capacity of an individual to solve problems and exhibit cognitive responses. According to Fox, only beings possessing critical self-awareness, the ability to manipulate complex concepts and use sophisticated language, and the capacity for reflection, planning, deliberation, choice, and accepting responsibility for actions qualify for moral consideration. But can we definitively assert that animals lack reason? Furthermore, is it acceptable to treat all beings lacking reason identically? For instance, is there no difference between striking a pig and striking a tree? Should humans lacking reason be deprived of rights? Due to these numerous issues, reason itself cannot serve as a standard.
Finally, there is the argument that being human itself is reason enough to possess rights. However, belonging to a particular group does not guarantee an individual’s rights or status. It is wrong to unfairly treat members of another group simply by riding on the coattails of one’s own group, without any other justification. Attempts to discriminate against another gender based on one’s own gender are called sexism; attitudes that discriminate against another race based on one’s own race are called racism; and finally, animal liberation advocates call the human prejudice that prioritizes humans simply because they are human “speciesism.” These terms all point out the wrongdoing that arises from justifying discrimination based solely on belonging to a particular group.
We now recognize that any difference we mention may blur the boundary between humans and animals. While this difference is more pronounced than those between genders or races, the distinction between animals and humans is merely one of average difference rather than a qualitative one. Furthermore, the criteria cited to justify the aforementioned forms of discrimination are highly arbitrary. Furthermore, while ‘difference’ relates to facts, ‘discrimination’ relates to values. Attempting to derive a question of values from a question of facts commits what is known as the naturalistic fallacy. When one attempts to justify discrimination by citing differences between humans and non-human animals, this constitutes committing the naturalistic fallacy.
Peter Singer, a leading figure in animal liberation theory, argued from an animal bioethics perspective that any being capable of pleasure and pain deserves equal moral consideration, and that speciesism—discriminating between humans and animals—is wrong. It is clear that animals possess the capacity for pleasure and pain. This is evident from their behavior patterns resembling humans when in pain, their similar nervous systems, and the fact that pain is evolutionarily useful, meaning animals that have survived to this day likely possess this capacity. Now, let us assume animals and humans are equal. Consider a situation where the interests of animals conflict with those of humans. For example, consider cats roaming the streets scavenging food waste. These cats spread disease and dirty the streets. Should we consider them subjects of moral concern and spare their lives? In such situations, sparing the cats seems counterintuitive. People might even feel it is their duty to catch and eliminate them. The cats are not roaming the streets with the intent to spread disease. They are merely trying to survive in a dirty environment and are inadvertently spreading disease as a result. From a position that strives for objectivity, harboring feelings of anger toward these animals can be seen as an anthropocentric attitude. However, we cannot simply condemn people for adopting this anthropocentric stance. In such cases, humans may face suffering that could potentially outweigh the animals’ interests. Yet, the approach of unconditionally killing and eliminating them because they are harmful to humans cannot be considered a proper solution. We must approach this more cautiously, engage in deeper discussions about the conflicting interests of humans and animals, and seek solutions.
Then what about the cloned sheep Dolly and the expanded nuclear transfer cloning research it enabled? Animal cloning raises significant concerns because it could potentially enable human cloning. However, this fear stems solely from the notion of blurring the boundaries between humans and animals. In reality, animal cloning can enable research into human genetic diseases and organ transplants, ultimately contributing to human health advancement. Positive aspects like protecting endangered species can also be considered. However, ethical issues are unavoidable given that such research involves animal suffering. We need a balanced approach that acknowledges the positive aspects of animal cloning while simultaneously considering animal welfare and rights.
In conclusion, the discussion on animal cloning must become a process of finding a balance between animal rights and human interests. We must move beyond anthropocentric thinking and acknowledge that animals are also subjects of moral consideration. Cloning research should proceed in a manner that respects the interests and rights of animals.
